13 September 2019

Independent National Security Legislation Monitor
By online submission

INSLM REVIEW OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (ASSISTANCE & ACCESS) ACT 2018 (TOLA ACT) – BSA COMMENTS

BSA | The Software Alliance (BSA) refers to the review by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) of the amendments made to Commonwealth legislation by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (TOLA Act or Assistance and Access Act), as referred to the INSLM by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS). ¹

BSA is the leading advocate for the global software industry before governments and in the international marketplace. BSA members ² earn users’ confidence by providing essential security technologies, such as encryption, to protect customers from cyber threats. These threats are posed by a broad range of malicious actors, including those who would steal citizens’ identities, harm their loved ones, steal commercially valuable secrets, or pose immediate danger to national security.

BSA thus has a significant interest in the issues being discussed in relation to the Assistance and Access Act, and thanks the INSLM for this opportunity to submit comments.

In relation to earlier reviews by the PJCIS of the Assistance and Access Act (including when it was only a bill), BSA had made four submissions to the PJCIS on:

- 12 October 2018 ³;
- 31 October 2018 ⁴;

¹ As notified on this review home page: https://www.inslm.gov.au/current-review-work.
⁴ Available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/ParliamentaryBusiness/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018/Submissions (as Supplementary to Submission 48).
In summary, our four submissions include concerns/recommendations on the following matters:

1. Improving oversight of the issuance and variation of technical assistance notices (TANs) and technical capability notices (TCNs) under the Assistance and Access Act.
2. Improving the definition of ‘systemic weakness’ (and the related ‘systemic vulnerability’).
3. Clarifying that the Assistance and Access Act does not introduce new interception authorities.
4. Limiting the scope of the Assistance and Access Act in terms of its extraterritorial effect and the organizations that are subject to it.
5. Limiting technical assistance requests (TARs), TANs, and TCNs to serious offences with a higher penalty threshold and to narrowly defined national security circumstances.
6. Ensuring the protection of technical information, including source code.
7. Improving the handling of vulnerability information.
8. De-criminalizing unauthorized disclosures of information by employees of designated communications providers.
9. Providing a longer time period for designated communications providers to comply with TANs and TCNs.

As we noted in our submissions to the PJCIS, the issues concerning the assistance and access regime are complex and sensitive. BSA and our members remain at the disposal of the INSLM and the Australian government to help develop and deliver other enduring solutions to address the challenges of accessing evidence in the digital age.

BSA | THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE

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APPENDIX A

BSA Submission to PJCIS

of

12 October 2018
12 October 2018

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
By online submission

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (ASSISTANCE AND ACCESS) BILL 2018 – BSA COMMENTS

A. Statement of Interest and Summary

BSA | The Software Alliance (BSA) is the leading advocate for the global software industry before governments and in the international marketplace. BSA’s members1 earn users’ confidence by providing essential security technologies, such as encryption, to protect customers from cyber threats. These threats are posed by a broad range of malicious actors, including those who would steal citizens’ identities, harm their loved ones, steal commercially valuable secrets, or pose immediate danger to national security.

BSA and our members thus have a significant interest in the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (Bill) introduced into the House of Representatives on 20 September 2018, which we understand is designed to enhance assistance from the communications industry and better enable law enforcement to investigate criminal and terrorist activities in the digital era.

BSA had earlier submitted comments to Australia’s Department of Home Affairs (DHA) 2 on the exposure draft of the Bill, and our interest in the Bill remains undiminished. We commend the Australian Government on having made various positive changes in the Bill since the exposure draft, and offer these updated comments and recommendations for consideration by the Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security (Committee) in its review of the Bill.

In summary, we recommend that:

1. the assistance and access regime should be underpinned by judicial authorization and a review process, wherein decisions to issue mandatory notices are made only by an independent judicial authority, and a robust and transparent review mechanism is available to the subjects of such notices;

1 BSA’s members include: Adobe, Akamai, Amazon Web Services, ANSYS, Apple, Autodesk, AVEVA, Baseplan Software, Bentley Systems, Box, CA Technologies, Cad Pacific/Power Space, Cadence, Cisco, CNC/Mastercam, DataStax, DocuSign, IBM, Informatica, Intel, MathWorks, Microsoft, Okta, Oracle, PTC, Salesforce, SAS Institute, Siemens PLM Software, Slack, Splunk, Symantec, Synopsys, Trend Micro, Trimble Solutions Corporation, and Workday.

2 A copy of BSA’s comments to the DHA is available at: https://www.bsa.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Data/09102018BSACommentsAssistanceandAccessBill2018.pdf
2. the “acts or things” that can be required from a service provider should be narrowed and made exhaustive, and the carve-out for “systemic weaknesses” should be expanded to include any weakness or vulnerability in any system, product, service or component;

3. the scope of the circumstances in which the powers under the Bill can be exercised should be limited to preventing or detecting serious crime and protecting against identified threats to national security in narrowly defined circumstances;

4. the application of the Bill to “designated communications providers” should be limited, both in terms of extraterritorial effect and the types of organizations that are subject to the Bill;

5. technical information disclosed by service providers should be protected by the relevant agencies; and

6. the new computer access warrants regime should include the same limitations and safeguards as the assistance and access regime.

B. General Comments

We acknowledge and support the Australian Government’s desire to have more powerful tools to aid in the fight against criminal and terrorist activity and to ensure that the rule of law applies equally to online and offline activity. As the Government considers new legislation to expand surveillance powers, one key area of focus is the ability of Australian law enforcement to access digital evidence. BSA supports this objective, and encourages close collaboration between the Government, Australian law enforcement, and the technology community to improve processes and methodologies enabling law enforcement access to digital evidence in a timely manner. At the same time, the debate over this legislation should not seek improvements to law enforcement access at the expense of privacy and security.

Given the complexity and sensitivity of the subject matter, we strongly encourage the Australian Government not to rush legislation, and instead take the time to thoroughly consider the broader issues at play and the implications (and possible unintended consequences) of the draft legislation.

The importance of security, privacy, and trust in the digital economy

Modern technology is giving us the potential to improve almost every aspect of our lives. BSA members are at the forefront of these data-driven innovations, including cutting-edge advancements in artificial intelligence, machine learning, cloud-based analytics, and the Internet of Things. These innovations are helping to make our devices smarter, our businesses more competitive, and the delivery of government services more efficient. Economists estimate that these technologies can grow Australia’s GDP by an incredible 1.2% per year, adding $250 billion to the economy by 2025.3 Australia’s forthcoming Digital Economy Strategy also recognizes the importance of modern technology to Australia’s long-term strategic interests.4

Such technology, which is now an integral part of every sector (including, manufacturing, logistics, transport, financial, legal, retail, and public services, to name a few), rely on a range of capabilities – including strong encryption, robust identity and authentication management, regular security patching,


and secure configurations – to safeguard not only privacy, but also the security and safety of communications and transmissions.

In the delivery of critical services such as electricity, for example, encryption is used to protect data in transit across the electricity grid, including communications to and from operations centers, power generation systems, distribution stations, and home “smart grid” networks. The potential disruption that cyber attacks could have on critical services has already been demonstrated when, on two separate occasions, hackers shut off power for hundreds of thousands of citizens in Ukraine. This dependence underscores how critical it is to ensure that this legislation is successful in improving law enforcement capacity to investigate serious crimes without compromising the technologies and tools that underpin security, privacy, and trust in the digital economy.

Access to Digital Evidence

A number of factors bear on law enforcement’s ability to access digital evidence in an ever-changing technological landscape. As communications, business processes, and routine daily activities are increasingly digitalized, more data – and more different types of data sets – are available to law enforcement than ever before. The rapidly increasing volume of data presents diverse new opportunities for law enforcement. Millions of Australians have transitioned in recent years from relying strictly on difficult-to-access telephone and written communications to digitally transmitted and stored emails, text messages, phone calls, instant messages, social media postings, and other communications. Other data, such as information about individuals’ banking transactions, purchases, Internet browsing histories, and geolocation, is also increasingly digitalized and available to law enforcement with appropriate process. Yet, this increasing volume of information also presents new challenges. Law enforcement’s ability to access such data can be challenged by factors such as limitations in technical training and capabilities for accessing diverse data types, continually evolving technologies, and insufficient forensic laboratory capacity.

BSA’s members have worked closely with law enforcement in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere around the world to ensure that law enforcement can access digital evidence in support of lawful criminal investigations in a timely manner pursuant to appropriate safeguards. For law enforcement to take advantage of the opportunities new technologies bring, and to overcome the array of associated challenges, digital evidence access must be approached collaboratively. In this regard, the Bill must serve as a platform to facilitate and deepen collaboration between the technology and law enforcement communities by establishing the foundation of a constructive partnership that takes into account the priorities, needs, and sensitivities of all relevant stakeholders.

The needs of law enforcement, technology providers, and the consumers whose privacy interests are at stake, are best met by policies and laws that provide for robust mechanisms for judicial oversight, transparency of activities, privacy protections, and clearly defined processes for bi-directional communication on law enforcement needs. In addition, as data is stored by global organizations subject to laws in different countries, it is increasingly important that laws for government access be interoperable.

BSA strongly urges continued dialogue between the Australian Government, policy-makers, and industry to find a solution that balances the legitimate rights, needs, and responsibilities of the Government, citizens, providers of critical infrastructure, third party stewards of data, and innovators. We would also welcome the opportunity to speak with the Committee at any hearing it holds.

C. Specific Comments and Recommendations

While the Bill addresses a range of issues associated with law enforcement assistance and access, BSA is chiefly concerned with the authorities outlined in Schedule 1 of the Bill for law enforcement to request or compel assistance from technology organizations in accessing electronic communications information; namely, the authorities to issue voluntary technical assistance requests (TARs), mandatory technical assistance notices (TANs), and technical capability notices (TCNs). The proposed TAN and TCN provisions, in particular, represent extraordinary new authorities of unprecedented scope and application.

BSA appreciates that the Australian Government has sought to build certain safeguards into the Bill, including laudable provisions ensuring that technology organizations are not required to implement “back doors” or to build systemic weaknesses into forms of electronic protection. However, BSA is concerned that the safeguards do not go far enough to protect principles such as security, privacy, and trust in the digital economy.

Accordingly, in addition to our general comments in Section B above on the policy and global regulatory environment, BSA offers in this Section C our specific comments and recommendations on the Bill (which we elaborate upon in Section D below):

1. The assistance and access regime should be underpinned by judicial authorization and a review process

The current Bill lacks a sufficient role for independent judicial authorities to oversee the issuance of mandatory TANs and TCNs. Decision-makers under the Bill can issue notices with very limited judicial oversight, based on evidence that may be unknown to the designated communications provider (Provider), and a subjective assessment of reasonableness and proportionality. While the Bill includes a negotiation process that can culminate in arbitration, this is focused on the terms and conditions of compliance, not whether it is appropriate for the notice to be issued in the first place.

BSA applauds the inclusion of new provisions in the Bill requiring the decision-maker to consider various matters before issuing a TAN or TCN, such as the legitimate interests of the Provider and the legitimate expectations of Australian citizens relating to cybersecurity and privacy. However, while these considerations are important, they should be considered by an independent, objective judicial authority rather than a decision-maker.

Example of issue that could arise under the current Bill:

A law enforcement agency suspects that information stored in an encrypted form on a Provider’s hosting service, by a customer of the Provider, is relevant to the agency’s criminal investigation. The agency secures a warrant to compel the Provider to disclose the information. The agency then takes the view that the Provider can decrypt and hand over the information, based on misinformation that the Provider has a ‘master decryption key’. The agency issues a TAN without consulting the Provider. The Provider does not have such a key but is unable to convince the agency to change its assessment because the Provider does not have any insight into the factors considered by the agency. The Provider is subsequently found to be in breach of the TAN requirement.

Judicial review may be precluded as the agency in this case could be acting within its scope of authority, as it has secured the underlying warrant, and the Bill does not require the agency to go through a further consultation process with the Provider. The Provider could therefore be left without remedy or recourse.

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6 See the following paragraphs from the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill:
- Paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights (page 16);
- Paragraph 8 of the Notes on Clauses (page 29);
- Paragraph 130 of the Notes on Clauses (page 49); and
- Paragraph 174 of the Notes on Clauses (page 55).

7 See, in particular, new sections 317RA and 317ZAA of the Telecommunications Act 1997 proposed to be inserted by the Bill.
than by the agency seeking to issue the TAN or TCN.

The regime should also allow the Provider to challenge the issuing of the TAN or TCN, as well as its scope and terms, before an independent judicial authority. In this regard, although we have significant concerns with some elements of the recent Statement of Principles on Access to Evidence and Encryption, issued in August 2018 by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, we agree with its statement that: “The principle that access by authorities to the information of private citizens occurs only pursuant to the rule of law and due process is fundamental to maintaining the values of our democratic society in all circumstances – whether in their homes, personal effects, devices, or communications”.

BSA recommends that:

• the decision to issue a TAN or TCN should be made by an independent judicial authority based on evidence from the requesting agency regarding the necessity of issuing a notice, as well as the reasonableness, proportionality, practicability, and feasibility of the proposed requirements; and

• the Bill should incorporate a robust judicial oversight and challenge mechanism that provides for full and transparent due process.

BSA also urges the Australian Parliament, as it considers the Bill and the issues it raises, to consider the precedent that the Bill – and its treatment of the question of independent judicial oversight – will set for other democratic and non-democratic governments, as they look to Australia’s model in considering similar legislation.

2. The “acts or things” that can be required from a Provider should be narrowed and made exhaustive, and the carve-out for “systemic weaknesses” should be expanded

The Bill sets forth a non-exhaustive list of “acts or things” that Australian Government agencies would be authorized to require of Providers through TANs or TCNs. As currently framed, this would effectively allow Government decision-makers to require a Provider to do anything they deem appropriate, leaving such decision-makers broad discretion in determining such measures. The breadth of this scope not only creates potential technical and legal challenges for Providers, but also presents risks to cybersecurity.

BSA is also concerned that the carve-out in relation to “systemic weaknesses” in respect of “a form of electronic protection” is too narrow because the Provider could still be required to: (a) take actions that impact system security in a non-systemic way; or (b) implement a systemic weakness into something other than electronic protection.

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Example of issue that could arise under the current Bill:
The “acts or things” envisioned in the Bill could compel Providers to compromise system security by:

• removing electronic protections applied for cybersecurity purposes;
• installing untested or uncertified software that could inadvertently introduce new systemic vulnerabilities; and
• disclosing vulnerabilities that have not yet been patched.

These vulnerabilities can all be exploited by bad actors, including nation state bad actors, who learn of these vulnerabilities.

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8 See, in particular, new sections 317L(3) and 317T(7) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 proposed to be inserted by the Bill.
BSA recommends that:

- each of the “acts or things” should be further clarified (our specific recommendations are set out in Section D of this submission), and that the list itself should be exhaustive and subject to an overarching condition that the requirements imposed on designated communications providers are the minimum necessary required for the relevant objective;

- Providers should not be compelled to reveal details of vulnerabilities which have not yet been patched, and a transparent policy for handling and disclosing vulnerabilities the Government discovers and that are unknown to the Provider should be included in the Bill;

- the “systemic weakness” carve-out should be broadened to include any weakness or vulnerability in any system, product, service, or component; and

- all of the “acts or things” should be subject to a requirement that they are practical and technically feasible.

3. The scope of the circumstances in which the powers can be exercised should be limited to preventing or detecting serious crime and protecting against identified threats to national security in narrowly defined circumstances

The Bill authorizes the issuance of TANs and TCNs for the purposes of “(a) enforcing the criminal law and laws imposing pecuniary penalties; or (b) assisting the enforcement of the criminal laws in force in a foreign country; or (c) safeguarding national security.”9 TARs can be issued for an even broader set of purposes, adding “the interests of Australia’s foreign relations or the interests of Australia’s national economic well-being” to the list.

Given the breadth of “acts or things” that can be required of Providers, BSA is concerned that the scope of circumstances in which the powers can be exercised is likewise unduly broad. BSA appreciates that the authors of the Bill have sought to narrow this scope by omitting “protecting the public revenue” from the list of purposes for which TARs, TANs, and TCNs can be issued. However, the remaining purposes – particularly the broad national security objective – remain broad and vague.

The principle that organizations could be required to engage in “acts or things” that go far beyond preventing or detecting serious crime or protecting against identified threats to national security under certain narrowly defined circumstances is troubling. Particularly in light of the absence of robust judicial oversight, this could empower Government decision-makers to require Providers to take actions beyond addressing

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9 We note that the purpose of “protecting the public revenue”, which was present in the exposure draft of the Bill, has been omitted in the version of the Bill that was introduced to the House of Representatives on 20 September 2018.
potential criminal or security threats within Australia, including activities in relation to intelligence collection, national defense, or foreign relations that could make private sector entities complicit in adversarial actions against another nation-state. By seeking to force Providers to assist in such activities, the Government could undermine Providers’ hard-won reputations for integrity and neutrality in the global marketplace, ultimately compromising the integrity of the digital economy.

Moreover, and as mentioned earlier, the Bill, and the unprecedented authorities it confers, would set a worrying precedent that other governments, including non-democratic or authoritarian governments, may look to in establishing counterpart laws.

BSA recommends that the scope of circumstances be narrowed substantially. This would include limiting the list of purposes for which TARs, TANs, and TCNs can be issued to:

- preventing or detecting serious crime; and
- protecting against an identified threat to national security under a narrowly defined set of circumstances, such as preventing an imminent national security threat to Australia and its citizens.

4. The application to “designated communications providers” should be limited, both in terms of extraterritorial effect and in terms of the types of organizations that are subject to the Bill

The Bill, as currently drafted, outlines a list of “designated communications providers” that would impact not only those Providers directly providing communications services in Australia, but also organizations operating outside of Australia and/or occupying roles in the supply chain that may be separated by several degrees from the direct Providers themselves. BSA notes that this could include organizations with virtually no control over the final product or service and virtually no link to Australia. This also raises concerns of conflicts of laws as foreign organizations may be required under a TAN or TCN to perform acts or things that are inconsistent with laws to which they are subject.

BSA recommends that the extraterritorial application of the Bill should be limited by reference to an active targeting of Australia, and that supply chain implications should be addressed by expressly carving out organizations that do not exercise control over the final product or service.

BSA also recommends that the principle, called out in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill (Explanatory Memorandum) but remaining unaddressed in the Bill itself – that the organization must be the most appropriate organization to provide the assistance – should be an explicit requirement for issuing a notice under the Bill.

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10 See paragraphs 131 and 175 of the Notes to Clauses of the Explanatory Memorandum (on pages 49 and 56, respectively).
Finally, BSA notes that there are new provisions in the Bill that provide Providers a defense against civil penalties for non-compliance with a TAN or TCN, where compliance with the TAN or TCN in a foreign jurisdiction will result in the Provider breaching the laws of that jurisdiction. **BSA recommends** that this defense should be extended to:

- non-compliance with a TAN or TCN in respect of activities **within Australia** that will result in a similar breach of the foreign jurisdiction’s laws;
- non-compliance with a provision contemplated under Schedules 2 through 5 of the Bill, in respect of activities in foreign jurisdictions as well as within Australia; and
- **criminal** penalties that the Provider may be exposed to in Australia due to non-compliance with any provision of the Bill where compliance will result in a breach of another jurisdiction’s laws.

5. **Any technical information disclosed by Providers should be protected by the relevant agencies**

The technical information, such as source code, held by BSA’s members constitutes one of their most valuable assets. Although the Bill includes limited non-disclosure responsibilities, it does very little to address concerns about the way in which the technical information will be protected and used. This exposes organizations to a risk of misuse or inadvertent disclosure, as well as having the potential to introduce a systemic weakness merely because the information is not properly protected.

Additionally, other jurisdictions who may decide to implement similar measures, but who do not have similarly robust or effective protection mechanisms against disclosure of sensitive technical information, could make similar requests for disclosure, putting those organizations at significant risk.

**BSA recommends** that:

- the Bill should include additional protections in respect of the use and protection of technical information, such as a purpose limitation, obligations to impose appropriate security measures, and limitations on retention periods; and
- technical information that Providers may be compelled to disclose should be limited to information that is public or commonly shared under commercial NDA arrangements, and Providers should not be forced to reveal their sensitive intellectual property, including source code.
6. **The new computer access warrants regime should include the same limitations and safeguards as the assistance and access regime**

BSA notes that the definition of “specified persons” is very broad, with very few safeguards.

**BSA recommends** that:

- the concerns and recommendations on the assistance and access regime, such as those regarding technical feasibility, reasonableness, and proportionality, should flow through into the computer access warrants regime; and

- law enforcement should be required to minimize interference with data or equipment and, to the extent this is unavoidable, to reimburse organizations for all losses suffered as a result of damage or destruction.

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### D. Further Details on Specific Comments and Recommendations

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<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Reference11</th>
<th>Description of issue</th>
<th>BSA Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Process, oversight and review</td>
<td>Sections 317L, 317P, 317RA, 317T, 317V, 317W, 317ZAA, and 317ZK, Schedule 1 of the Bill, section 1 (Amendment to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977)</td>
<td>A large number of decision-makers can issue notices under the Bill. They can do so with limited judicial oversight and based on evidence that may be unknown to the Provider who receives the notice. The decision-maker must not give a notice unless he/she is satisfied that the requirements are reasonable and proportionate, and that compliance is practicable and technically feasible. However, this assessment is based on the decision-maker's subjective satisfaction rather than any objective measures. The decision-maker may not understand, or be best placed to assess, the impact of a notice on the recipient organization, including the costs of compliance, impact on customers, and broader issues of security, privacy, and intellectual property. While the Explanatory Memorandum explains that agencies are expected to engage in a dialogue with the Provider before issuing a notice,12 the Bill itself</td>
<td>The decision to issue a notice should be made by an independent judicial authority (for example, the categories of eligible judges and nominated Administrative Appeals Tribunal members who have authority to issue interception warrants under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979), based on evidence submitted by the requesting agency regarding the necessity of issuing a notice, in addition to the reasonableness, proportionality, practicality, and feasibility of the proposed “acts or things” and the consistency of the proposed notice with the underlying warrant. The requirement for “dialogue” prior to issuing notices, as referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum, should be reflected within the Bill itself. This dialogue should happen before the agency submits evidence to the (recommended) independent judicial authority in order to issue a notice, and should consider both the necessity of</td>
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11 References are to the sections in the Telecommunications Act 1997 proposed to be inserted or amended by the Bill, unless otherwise specified.

12 See paragraphs 132 and 176 of the Notes to Clauses of the Explanatory Memorandum (on pages 49 and 56, respectively).
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<td>does not mandate any dialogue but, in relation to TCNs only, simply requires the Attorney-General to provide a notice and consider any submission made by the Provider and an optional assessment report jointly commissioned (under section 317W(7)) by the Attorney-General and the Provider at the cost of the Provider (unless the Attorney-General agrees to reimburse part or all of the cost).</td>
<td>issuing the notice as well as the assistance to be provided under the notice. Further, the assessment report should be commissioned by default and through a fair and transparent process to address the appointment of the assessor without undue delay, unless both parties agree to waive the requirement for an assessment report, with the costs of the assessment borne by the Australian Government on the principle of cost-causality. All the foregoing should supplement the existing proposed regime for issuing TANs, as well as replace the limited consultation regime for TCNs in the currently-drafted section 317W.</td>
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<td>• In relation to the optional assessment mentioned above, the Bill requires the assessment to be completed and submitted to the Attorney-General within a consultation period specified by the Attorney-General. It may not be practicable for the assessment to be completed (or possibly even commenced) within this period if the Attorney-General keeps to the minimum specified period of 28 days, especially if the Attorney-General and the Provider are unable to arrive at a decision over the appointment of the joint assessor.</td>
<td>• Sections 317RA and 317ZAA(^\text{13}) now require the decision-maker to consider both the interests of the requesting agency and the interests of the Provider, as well as various other factors, prior to issuing a TAN or TCN. However these sections should also expressly require the consideration of other factors that were called out in the previous Explanatory Document,(^\text{14}) such as: the likely benefits of an investigation; the potential business impact on the Provider; whether the Provider to whom the notice is to be issued is the most appropriate party to provide the assistance (see also item 4 below); and the potential impact on third parties.</td>
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<td>• Further, a decision to issue a TAN or TCN is not subject to merits review or any other mechanism that allows Providers to challenge the issuing of such a notice. There is also very limited recourse that Provides will have to judicial review. While this is consistent with other legislation in Australia governing national security and law enforcement, the purposes for which TANs and TCNs can be issued, and the “listed acts or things” that may be required, are much broader than any legislative precedent (see items 2 and 3 below).</td>
<td>• The Bill should include a procedure to allow the Provider to challenge a notice on its merits, including the necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, practicability, and feasibility of complying with the notice. This would also include the ability to request a review of the decision to issue the notice based on any new evidence that arises after the decision is made. At the minimum, the Bill should not exclude proposed Part 15 of the <em>Telecommunications Act 1997</em> (i.e., the proposed provisions governing the issuance of TARs, TANs, and TCNs) from the scope of the <em>Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)</em> Act so as to afford affected Providers full and proper recourse to judicial review in respect of executive decisions taken under the</td>
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<td>• While the Bill allows the parties to agree on the terms and conditions on which the Provider must comply with a TAN or TCN as part of a process that can culminate in arbitration, this does not formally extend to whether the decision-maker should have issued the notice in the first place, or whether the Provider should be required to comply with it. Further, the arbitrator him/herself is to be appointed by the Attorney-General,</td>
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\(^{13}\) Sections 317RA and 317ZAA were previously not included in the exposure draft of the Bill.

\(^{14}\) The Explanatory Document issued in August 2018 and accompanying the exposure draft of the Bill; at pages 34 and 37.
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<tr>
<td>Giving rise to a potential conflict of interest.</td>
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<td>proposed Part 15 of the <em>Telecommunications Act 1997</em>.</td>
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<td>• The “no cost, no profit” rule only applies to reasonable out-of-pocket costs and is likely to leave Providers bearing substantial costs themselves.</td>
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<td>• To address conflict of interest concerns, the arbitrator under section 317ZK should be appointed by one or more independent third parties, not the Attorney-General.</td>
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<td>• Providers should be entitled to recover the actual costs of compliance with a notice. In particular, the Bill should make clear that “costs” include not only third-party out-of-pocket expenditure, but also other costs, such as costs arising from the termination of customer relationships that result from compliance with a notice, and overhead costs. For example, if a Provider is required to comply with a TCN to develop a new functionality, this will likely require a reallocation of internal technical resources and this carries an overhead cost that should be reimbursed.</td>
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<td>2. Scope of “listed acts or things”</td>
<td>Sections 317E, 317L, 317P, 317T, 317V, 317ZF, 317ZG</td>
<td>• The “listed acts and things” that could be required of Providers through TANs and TCNs are overly broad, non-exhaustive, and, amongst other things, could require them to: &lt;br&gt; o decrypt communications; &lt;br&gt; o install government spyware on their systems; &lt;br&gt; o develop a new technology or capability; &lt;br&gt; o modify any characteristic of a service; &lt;br&gt; o replace portions of their service with a service provided by another party; and &lt;br&gt; o conceal any such acts or things.</td>
<td>• A Provider to whom a notice is issued should only be required to comply to the extent that it is objectively practical, technically feasible, reasonable, and proportionate. This should not be a subjective assessment made by the decision-maker (as set out in sections 317P and 317V).</td>
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<td>• This list goes far beyond any set of prescriptive requirements under any Australian law and, to our knowledge, any other law internationally. It effectively requires the Provider to do virtually anything that the requesting agency requires, including measures that could undermine trust in a business or adversely impact cybersecurity.</td>
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<td>• The distinction between when a TAN or a TCN is used should be clarified within the wording of the Bill itself and not just in the Explanatory Memorandum. The acts and things that can be specified in a TAN (and the Provider’s obligation to comply with the TAN) should be limited to those forms of assistance that the relevant Provider is capable of giving. There should also be a further definition of “capability” to clarify that it must be reasonably practicable, taking into account, amongst other things, the Provider’s existing system configuration and the resources reasonably available to the Provider. Further, the Bill should include provisions stipulating when law enforcement must rely on a TCN instead of a TAN.</td>
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<td>• This list is also not exhaustive in relation to TARs and TANs. A non-exhaustive list creates an untenable grey area because Providers cannot reasonably plan or resource for the acts or things they may be required to perform.</td>
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<td>• The listed acts and things should be an exhaustive list, not just in relation to the “listed help” required under a TCN. It is not appropriate to request Providers to</td>
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The decision-making criteria that the requirements must be “reasonable and proportionate” and that compliance with the notice must be “practicable and technically feasible” is not adequately clear and consequently gives the decision-maker very broad discretion, which is inappropriate given that the decision-maker may not have all the information, knowledge, and experience necessary to make an informed decision.

The distinction between a TAN and a TCN is unclear. The Explanatory Memorandum provides that the “acts or things specified in a [TAN] will be limited to forms of assistance a [P]rovider is already capable of giving”, and gives the example that a TAN “may require a [P]rovider to assist with the decryption of material lawfully intercepted under a warrant if their systems enable them to decrypt this material” and could not “require a provider to build a new decryption capability”. However, this is not reflected in the wording of the Bill itself. Without diminishing concerns regarding the compromise to privacy and security, a Provider may, for example, be technically capable of building a decryption capability which does not currently exist in its systems, but does not have the resources to do so and significant compromise to its systems; and as drafted, there is nothing in the Bill proscribing the ability of the decision-maker to use a TAN to require the Provider to build such a capability.

There are also no provisions in the Bill specifying when law enforcement must rely on a TCN instead of a TAN to compel a Provider to do an act or thing. As the Bill is currently drafted, a Provider could be required to do the same acts and things whether under a TAN or a TCN. In fact, the list of acts of things that a Provider can be required to do under a TAN is potentially broader (as section 317T(4)(c) purports to exclude acts or things under section 317E(1)(a) from the scope of TCNs), whereas there is no similar limitation in respect of TANs). This is especially concerning when considering the relatively fewer checks and balances that currently exist in the perform acts or things that go beyond this already very broad list. Additionally, the requirement to “conceal any such acts or things” should be confined to concealing that a particular law enforcement activity is in process, rather than the fact that a technical capability or thing exists as a result of a TAN or TCN. As with lawful interception capabilities today, capabilities developed as a result of a TAN or TCN should be publicly documented; any other approach represents creating undocumented backdoors. Further, Providers should not be compelled to reveal details of vulnerabilities which have not yet been patched and a transparent policy for vulnerability handling, and we encourage the Government to develop and include in the Bill a clearly articulated policy describing how it will handle vulnerabilities and what processes it will use to govern timely disclosure of that information to actors capable of fixing them. Finally, and most importantly, there should be an overarching condition that any requirements imposed on Providers are the minimum necessary required for the relevant objective.

The Bill should provide more clarity in relation to what is required under each listed act or thing. This should consist of a narrower scope in relation to each item, and guidance as to what is and is not required. In particular:
- sub-section (1)(a): the requirement to remove electronic protection should be qualified to the extent that it would not create a risk of destroying, corrupting, or disrupting any hardware, software, or data;
- sub-section (1)(b): the requirement to provide “technical information” should define the types of information to be provided and expressly carve out certain types of information such as source code and network diagrams;
- sub-section (1)(c): the requirement to install, maintain, test, or use software or equipment (including installing software or hardware provided by an agency) is too broad and could have a serious impact on security – this should be limited to software or hardware that has been...
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<td>• Providers are prevented under section 317ZF from disclosing information relating to TARs, TANs, and TCNs, including the issuance or existence of such notices or requests, with section 317ZF(13) permitting a Provider to disclose only aggregated numbers on the total number of TARs, TANs, or TANs received during a reporting period that is not less than 6 months. The lack of greater information available to the public could undermine consumer trust in not only the Providers’ services, but also in the use of modern technology in general. While a new section 317ZFA has been introduced which allow the courts greater powers over, among other things, the disclosure of information, are no provisions which confer authority on the issuer of the TAR, TAN, or TCN, in the first instance, to permit more transparent reporting by the Provider.</td>
<td>independently certified to meet at least the same levels of security that the host system meets and should not impact the system’s performance or availability;</td>
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<td>• The prohibition against building backdoors is very limited. It only prohibits building in systemic weaknesses or vulnerabilities into forms of electronic protection (i.e., encryption). The likelihood is that carrying out any of the listed acts or things has the potential, in some circumstances, to introduce a systemic weakness, not only in the context of electronic protection. For example, a notice could require a Provider to install software provided by an agency (under section 317E(1)(c)), which allows the agency to access data hosted on the Provider’s technology platform – this would not be prevented by section 317ZG as it does not require the provider to implement a systemic weakness into a form of electronic protection; however, it may nonetheless create serious security weaknesses by enabling access to data.</td>
<td>o sub-section (1)(d): the requirement to provide information in a particular format should be subject to a qualification that the format is secure;</td>
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<td>o sub-section (1)(f): the requirement to assist with testing, modification, development, or maintenance of a technology or capability is extremely broad and potentially very onerous – if law enforcement wishes to develop technology, it should not be entitled to lean on technology organizations to perform the development for them; and this requirement should accordingly be limited to integration rather than developing entirely new functionality;</td>
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<td>o sub-section (1)(g): the requirement to notify relevant updates to the Provider’s services or activities should be further clarified and narrowed to take into account products increasingly being delivered over the cloud (including software-as-a-service) where potentially relevant product improvements and updates (including patches to close security vulnerabilities) are delivered frequently and sometimes urgently, and where a notification requirement, in light of these practices, would be unduly burdensome and could significantly slow product development and time-to-market, and also compromise security;</td>
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<td>o sub-sections (1)(h) and (1)(i): the requirements to modify the characteristics of a service or substitute a service are too broad and unclear, and could potentially compel a Provider to modify or substitute a service to store a secret, unencrypted copy of data, or enable authorities to sight what the end user sees on a screen; and in absence of clear guiding criteria on what modifications or substitutions the authorities may require, these sub-sections should be removed; and</td>
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<td>o sub-section (1)(j): the requirement to conceal certain actions should be removed (along with the related sub-section (2)) as it is unclear when there would be a situation where a Provider</td>
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<td>can comply without making false or misleading statements or engaging in dishonest conduct.</td>
<td>• The Bill should require that each time a TAR, TAN, or TCN is issued, the issuer will need to carefully evaluate, in consultation with the relevant Provider, the need for secrecy, and (if secrecy is required) the duration of secrecy that would need to be applied; and the Bill should accordingly grant the issuer of the TAR, TAN, or TCN, the authority to determine the appropriate level and duration of secrecy to be required for each case, including dispensing with the need for secrecy in appropriate cases. The Bill should also include a review process to allow Providers the ability to request the issuer of the TAR, TAN, or TCN for reconsideration of the need for secrecy (e.g., due to a change in circumstances).</td>
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<td>• A notice should have no effect to the extent it requires a Provider to implement any weakness or vulnerability (i.e., not just systemic weaknesses or vulnerabilities) in any system, product, service, or component, including devices, facilities, hardware, and equipment (i.e., not just a weakness in forms of electronic protection, such as encryption).</td>
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<td>• Alternatively, if the reference to “systemic” is to remain, the Bill should include a clear definition of “systemic” which not only includes wholesale weakening of security on a range of services, devices, or software, but extends to any weakening or vulnerability (even on a single system) which could cause weakening or vulnerability to security on a larger scale.</td>
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3. Circumstances in which powers can be exercised

Sections 317G, 317L, 317T

• The purposes for which a request or notice can be issued are overly broad. These purposes include enforcing criminal law and laws imposing pecuniary penalties, assisting the enforcement of criminal laws in force in a foreign country, safeguarding national security and, for TARs, the interests of Australia’s foreign relations or national economic well-being. They can also include “a matter that facilitates, or is ancillary or incidental to”, any of the

• The purposes for which a request or notice can be issued should be limited to the following matters:
  o the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime (i.e., the Bill should include qualifiers for “seriousness” and “preventing or detecting”, consistent with, for example, the requirements under the UK Investigatory Powers Act); and
  o the purpose of protecting against an identified threat to national security
relevant objectives, which further broadens the scope.

- It is unclear why the exceptional authorities to issue TANs or TCNs should extend to the enforcement of laws imposing pecuniary penalties, which would include laws imposing fines in respect of minor offences such as vehicle parking violations.

- Additionally, TANs and TCNs requiring that Providers assist elements of Australia’s national security apparatus for an undefined national security purpose, without limitation on the set of circumstances for seeking such assistance, could lead to requiring private sector organizations to act – or be perceived as acting – in complicity with adversarial security actions taken by the Australian Government in relation to foreign nations, or in actions impacting bilateral trade relations. Such perceptions could pose severe risks to such organizations’ ability to compete in foreign markets.

- While these purposes are consistent with those for which agencies can seek assistance under section 313 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, the application of the Telecommunications Act 1997 is limited to carriers and carriage service providers, and does not extend to the broad range of “designated communications providers” to which the Bill applies (see item 4 below). Furthermore, the “listed acts or things” under the Bill (see item 2 above) go far beyond anything in the Telecommunications Act 1997.

- While this is tempered somewhat by a provision that limits applicability in cases where the required act or thing would require a warrant or authorization under certain listed statutes, the principle that organizations should be required to perform the “listed acts or things” to achieve such broadly-defined and vague objectives sets a troubling precedent and goes beyond even the UK Investigatory Powers Act.

- All other “relevant objectives” should be removed, even in the case of voluntary TARs, as including them within such requests suggests that it is reasonable for the government to request support (even on a voluntary basis) in the context of these broadly-defined objectives, which is objectionable as a principle.

- The broad catch-all for “a matter that facilitates, or is ancillary to, or incidental to” should also be removed as this could potentially present a justification in a range of very loosely-related scenarios, as determined by the decision-maker.

- In addition to the decision-maker being satisfied that issuing a notice is necessary in the first place (see item 1 above), the “listed acts or things” in the notice should themselves be necessary. The purposes should not simply be “objectives” of requesting or requiring the “listed act or thing”.

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16 This would be consistent with, for example, the UK Investigatory Powers Act provisions.
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| 4. Broad application to “designated communications providers” and extraterritorial effect | Section 317C Schedules 2 through 5 of the Bill (in relation to assistance that that Providers may be required to provide under the provisions contemplated in these Schedules) | • The definition of “designated communications provider” is so broad as to have the potential to capture most of the global technology supply chain, including organizations that have virtually no link to Australia. These could include, amongst others:  
  o electronic service providers with one or more end users in Australia (i.e., potentially those having any website that does not geoblock Australia);  
  o manufacturers of components that are “likely to be used in Australia” (even if the manufacturer does not control where those components are ultimately used); and  
  o organizations that develop, supply, or update software that can be installed on equipment that is “likely to be connected to a telecommunications network in Australia” (again, even if the software developer does not specifically target Australia).  

• The Bill applies to the full range of participants in the supply chain, including hardware manufacturers, over-the-top messaging service providers, and cloud services providers, even where those participants may have little or no control over: (a) how their components or services are ultimately used (including whether they are used in Australia); or (b) the data that is processed using their components or systems (which may be owned and controlled by the organization’s customer or other parties much further down the supply chain).  

• The Bill gives rise to a conflict of laws issue because it is so broad as to require an organization with operations or customers in one or more foreign jurisdictions to perform acts or things that may be inconsistent with laws to which the organization is subject. In those situations, the organization would have to choose which law to comply with, and which law to breach. While there is a new section 317ZB(5) which provides Providers a defense against civil penalties for non-compliance with a TAN or TCN, where compliance with the TAN or TCN in a foreign jurisdiction will result in the Provider breaching the laws of that jurisdiction, this defense does not  
| • The extraterritorial application of the Bill to “designated communications providers” should be limited to organizations that actively and directly target or offer their goods or services to persons or organizations in Australia. Mere availability (or likelihood of availability) of a product or service in Australia in the absence of active targeting should be expressly carved out. The approach taken by the EU’s GDPR, albeit in the context of a different subject matter, is a useful benchmark, because (via the wording of the regulation and the associated recitals) the GDPR is clear that there has to be some level of targeting – simply being available in a country does not mean that the organization is actively doing business in that country.  

• The following items should be removed from the definition of “designated communications providers” because the focus should be on the primary service provider or manufacturer, not the entire supply chain:  
  o item 8 (manufacturers / suppliers of components for use in telecommunications facilities);  
  o item 10 (manufacturers / suppliers of customer equipment);  
  o item 11 (manufacturers / suppliers of components for use in customer equipment);  
  o item 14 (manufacturers / suppliers / installers / maintenance providers of data processing devices); and  
  o item 15 (software developers / suppliers / updaters).  

• There should be an express requirement that the organization that is the subject of the notice is the most appropriate organization to provide the assistance sought. This principle is referenced in the Explanatory Memorandum\(^ {17}\) but does not appear in the Bill. This should be captured within the Bill itself and should be a requirement for issuing a notice and not only a consideration. Further, as part of the recipient’s right to challenge, as proposed in item 1 above, the recipient should be entitled to challenge whether it is indeed the most appropriate organization to provide the

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\(^{11}\) See paragraphs 131 and 175 of the Notes to Clauses of the Explanatory Memorandum (on pages 49 and 56, respectively).
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| **extend to the situation where the Provider’s compliance with:**  
  (a) a TAN or TCN in respect of activities within Australia; or  
  (b) a requirement imposed under a provision in Schedules 2 through 5 of the Bill, in respect of activities in foreign jurisdictions and/or within Australia, will result in a similar breach of the foreign jurisdiction’s laws; or to criminal penalties to which the Provider may be exposed under the Bill. | requested assistance and to refer to the agency to another organization who may be better placed to provide the assistance.  
• The Bill should address the conflict of laws issue by stating that Providers will have a defense against both civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance with a requirement imposed under the Bill, where compliance with that requirement (whether within or outside Australia) would expose the Provider to liability under any other laws or regulations to which it is subject. |

5. Unauthorized disclosure of information  
Section 317ZF  
Schedules 2 through 5 of the Bill (in relation to assistance that that Providers may be required to provide under the provisions contemplated in these Schedules)  
• The requirement under section 317E(1)(b) to “provide technical information” is broad and may require Providers to hand over commercially-sensitive information, even if the categories of information required are limited as recommended at item 2 above.  
• This exposes Providers to substantial risks and these are not adequately addressed by the Bill. For example:  
  o the Bill does not limit the purposes for which the technical information can be used;  
  o the Bill does not require that the technical information be protected by appropriate security measures;  
  o the exceptions to the offence for disclosing information in relation to a TAR, TAN, or TCN are too broad (e.g., in connection with the performance of functions or exercise of powers by certain government agencies, which could cover virtually any disclosure by the relevant government agencies);  
  o the Bill does not impose any requirement to minimize the volume of technical information requested;  
  o the Bill does not impose time limits on the duration for which the technical information can be retained; and  
  o the Bill does not include safeguards to prevent indirect sharing of commercially-sensitive information with the Provider’s competitors.  
• Further, if the information is not properly protected, simply handing over this information has the potential to create a systemic weakness.  
• The Bill should include a purpose limitation on the use of information – i.e., the purpose for which technical information (or other information disclosed in accordance with a TAR, TAN, TCN, or any other provision of the Bill) can be used should be expressly limited to the purposes for which such information was obtained (see item 3 above regarding “relevant objectives”).  
• Information disclosed under the Bill should always be kept confidential other than with consent from the relevant provider of the information. There should also be a commitment to protect the information using appropriate security measures.  
• Only information which is public or commonly shared under non-disclosure agreements should be requested. Other more sensitive organizational information should be excluded from this requirement.  
• The exceptions to the disclosure offence should be substantially narrowed and should be subject to the original purpose limitation.  
• Any disclosure, even within an agency, should be on a strict need-to-know basis linked to the relevant purpose limitation.  
• There should be a data minimization requirement – i.e., the Provider should only need to provide the minimum information required for the relevant purpose. |
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<td>6. Assistance relating to computer access warrants</td>
<td>Schedule 2 to the Bill: section 64A of the SDA. See also Schedules 3 to 5 to the Bill, setting out amendments to the <em>Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979</em> (<em>ASIO Act</em>), <em>Crimes Act 1914</em> (<em>Crimes Act</em>) and <em>Customs Act 1901</em> (<em>Customs Act</em>)</td>
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<td>• Similarly, when requesting information under the other provisions in the Bill, there are only limited circumstances in which an order can be obtained in a proceeding to restrict the disclosure of information about computer access technologies or other commercially-sensitive information.</td>
<td>• Information should only be retained for so long as is necessary for the relevant purpose and there should be an express requirement for secure deletion or destruction of the information when that time period expires.</td>
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<td>• Information should only be retained for so long as is necessary for the relevant purpose and there should be an express requirement for secure deletion or destruction of the information when that time period expires.</td>
<td>• In line with the “no cost” principle, there should be dollar for dollar recovery if the Provider suffers any loss in connection with it providing the technical information, including loss suffered as a result of a breach of the obligations on use and disclosure of the information.</td>
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<td>• The definition of “specified persons” who may be required to provide information and assistance is very broad and includes: o a person engaged under a contract for services by the owner / lessee of the computer; and o a person who is or was a system administrator for the system including the computer or device, and who has relevant knowledge of the computer or network that the computer forms part of, or the measures applied to protect data held in the computer. This is so broad that it could potentially apply to all app and software developers and platforms simply because the owner of a computer has downloaded an app or software.</td>
<td>• This regime should be adjusted in line with the proposed amendments set out above in relation to Schedule 1 of the Bill. In particular: o there should be an express requirement that the specified person is the most appropriate person to provide the information or assistance sought (e.g., a system administrator should not be asked for passwords to unlock a computer); o assistance or information should only need to be provided to the extent it is practical and technically feasible, reasonable and proportionate; and o the specified person should only be asked to provide assistance or information if the specified person is capable of doing so (rather than having “relevant knowledge”).</td>
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<td>• Further, law enforcement officers are not required to minimize interference with data or equipment when executing a warrant. Executing officers are allowed to damage or destroy data or equipment to conceal actions taken under a warrant.</td>
<td>• Further, the Bill should, in relation to any requirement imposed on a specified person to provide assistance or information: o introduce an immunity that releases a specified person from any criminal or civil liability for, or in relation to, any act or thing the specified person does in compliance (or in good faith in purported compliance) in providing such assistance or information; and o provide for reimbursement of all costs incurred by a specified person associated with providing such assistance or information (in line with recommendation relating to costs as set out in item 1 above).</td>
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<td>• Law enforcement officers should be under an express obligation to minimize interference with data or equipment when executing a warrant and, to the</td>
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### E. Conclusion and Next Steps

Given the complexity of the Bill, the sensitivity of the subject matter, and the limited consultation period, the summary above is not an exhaustive list of BSA’s concerns and recommendations in respect of the Bill. There are other aspects of the Bill that require further consideration in order to find the right balance between the legitimate rights, needs, and responsibilities of the Australian Government, citizens, providers of critical infrastructure, third party stewards of data, and innovators.

As such, we respectfully encourage the Australian Government to engage in further dialogue with industry to consider the broader issues at play and the implications (and possible unintended consequences) of the Bill.

BSA and our members remain at the disposal of the Australian Government to participate in any industry and stakeholder groups, not only to assess the impact of the Bill, but also to help develop and deliver other enduring solutions to address the challenges of accessing evidence in the digital age.

If you require any clarification or further information in respect of this submission, please contact the undersigned at darrynl@bsa.org or +65 6292 0680.

Yours faithfully,

Darryn Lim
Director, Policy – APAC
APPENDIX B

BSA Submission to PJCIS

of

31 October 2018
31 October 2018

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
By email to: Committee, PJCIS (REPS) <pjcis@aph.gov.au>

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (ASSISTANCE AND ACCESS) BILL 2018 – BSA RESPONSE ON “SYSTEMIC WEAKNESS”

BSA | The Software Alliance (BSA) thanks the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (Committee) for the opportunity to appear before it during the public hearing on 19 October 2018, and to share the views of BSA and our members on the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (Bill).

During the hearing, the Committee requested that BSA take on notice the issue of the definition of “systemic weakness”, as used in the new section 317ZG that the Bill proposes to insert into the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Section 317ZG). We set out our response below.

General Comments

BSA’s members1 rely on essential security technologies, such as encryption, to protect customers from cyber threats, while delivering cutting-edge data-driven advancements in emerging areas such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, cloud-based analytics, and the Internet of Things. Therefore, while BSA and our members continue to acknowledge and support the Australian Government’s desire to have more powerful tools to aid in the fight against criminal and terrorist activities, we also urge the Australian Government to ensure that improvements to law enforcement access are not made at the expense of privacy, security, and, most importantly, trust in the technologies and tools that underpin the digital economy.

It remains the considered view of BSA and our members that any weakness or vulnerability in a system, regardless of how it is limited or controlled, could be exploited by bad actors with the requisite technological knowledge and means. As such, if the powers under the Bill were exercised to require a weakness or vulnerability to be created or implemented into any system for the purposes of accessing data, then whether or not the weakness or vulnerability relates directly or otherwise to a form of electronic protection, that vulnerability or weakness could be exploited in a manner that puts the data of everyone who uses that technology at risk. Many of the large-scale cyber breaches today originate from the compromise of a small vulnerability that allows the attacker to gain an initial foothold to launch more malicious attacks.

1 BSA’s members include: Adobe, Akamai, Amazon Web Services, ANSYS, Apple, Autodesk, AVEVA, Baseplan Software, Bentley Systems, Box, CA Technologies, Cad Pacific/Power Space, Cadence, Cisco, CNC/Mastercam, DataStax, DocuSign, IBM, Informatica, Intel, MathWorks, Microsoft, Okta, Oracle, PTC, Salesforce, SAS Institute, Siemens PLM Software, Slack, Splunk, Symantec, Synopsys, Trend Micro, Trimble Solutions Corporation, and Workday.
Proposed Amendments to Section 317ZG

It is nonetheless BSA’s and our members’ desire to remain as responsive and helpful as we can to the Committee’s deliberations on the matter. Accordingly, we offer the following proposed amendments to Section 317ZG for the Committee’s consideration:

(Red double-underlined text = text to be added; red struck-through text = text to be deleted)

317ZG  Designated communications provider must not be required to implement or build a systemic weakness or systemic vulnerability etc.

(1) A technical assistance notice or technical capability notice must not have the effect of:
(a) requiring a designated communications provider to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into a form of electronic protection; or
(b) preventing a designated communications provider from rectifying a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, in a form of electronic protection.

(2) The reference in paragraph (1)(a) to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into a form of electronic protection includes a reference to implement or build a new decryption capability in relation to a form of electronic protection.

(3) The reference in paragraph (1)(a) to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into a form of electronic protection includes a reference to one or more actions that would render a systemic methods of authentication or encryption less effective.

(4) Subsections (2) and (3) are enacted for the avoidance of doubt.

(5) A technical assistance notice or technical capability notice has no effect to the extent (if any) to which it would have an effect covered by paragraph (1)(a) or (b).

(6) In this [section][Part]:

system includes product, service, and component.

systemic weakness means a weakness in a system that extends, or carries the risk of being extended, beyond a targeted system in a manner that affects:
(a) other systems;
(b) the integrity of activities or processes, including patch management or configuration, that are integral to the functionality or security of other systems; or
(c) other users of the targeted system or other systems.

systemic vulnerability means a systemic weakness that can be exploited to negatively impact a system or a user of the system.

These proposed amendments represent our attempt at providing a definition for “systemic weakness”, and the related “systemic vulnerability”, while giving effect to our recommendation (in our 12 October 2018 submission to the Committee) that the “systemic weakness” carve-out should be broadened to include any weakness or vulnerability in any system, product, service, or component.

We would welcome the opportunity to continue refining the language above in discussion and collaboration with the Committee and the relevant Government stakeholders.
Conclusion

As previously noted in our 12 October 2018 submission to the Committee, the Bill and the issues relating thereto are complex and sensitive. In addition to the comments and proposals above, BSA would again like to commend, for the Committee’s consideration, the other recommendations in our 12 October 2018 submission, including that:

1. the assistance and access regime should be underpinned by judicial authorization and a review process, wherein decisions to issue mandatory notices are made only by an independent judicial authority, and a robust and transparent review mechanism is available to the subjects of such notices; and

2. the scope of the Bill should be narrowed with respect to:
   a. the “acts or things” that can be required from a service provider;
   b. the scope of the circumstances in which the powers under the Bill can be exercised; and
   c. the application of the Bill to “designated communications providers”, both in terms of extraterritorial effect and the types of organizations that are subject to the Bill.

In relation to recommendation 1 above, even with the proposed definition of “systemic weakness” above, there still needs to be a determination of when a weakness extends, or carries the risk of being extended, beyond a targeted system. Given the complexity involved in making such a determination, this would be yet another reason for why technical assistance notices and technical capability notices under the Bill require independent judicial authorization and a review process; and why the determination should not be made by a member of the executive involved in issuing such notices due to the inherent conflict of interest.

We again respectfully encourage the Australian Government to engage in further dialogue with industry to consider the broader issues at play and the implications (and possible unintended consequences) of the Bill.

BSA and our members remain at the disposal of the Committee and the Australian Government to participate in any industry and stakeholder groups, not only to continue refining the proposed Section 317ZG language above, but also to help develop and deliver other enduring solutions to address the challenges of accessing evidence in the digital age.

If you require any clarification or further information in respect of this submission, please contact the undersigned at darrynl@bsa.org or +65 6292 0680.

Yours faithfully,

Darryn Lim
Director, Policy – APAC
APPENDIX C

BSA Submission to PJCIS

of

12 February 2019
12 February 2019

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
By online submission

REVIEW OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (ASSISTANCE AND ACCESS) ACT 2018 – BSA COMMENTS

BSA | The Software Alliance (BSA) thanks the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (Committee) for the opportunities to comment on the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (Bill) (as it was then known), including at a public hearing held by the Committee on 19 October 2018, and through written submissions made to the Committee on 12 October 2018 and 31 October 2018.1

BSA and our members2 reaffirm our significant interest in the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Act) as introduced and passed by the Australian Parliament on 6 December 2018. We would like to offer the following comments and recommendations for the Committee’s consideration in its review of the Act.

A. GENERAL COMMENTS

We continue to acknowledge and support the Australian Government’s desire to have more powerful tools to aid in the fight against criminal and terrorist activities, while urging the adoption of further safeguards to ensure that the authorities under the Act are not exercised to the undue detriment of privacy, security, and trust in the digital economy.

We commend the Committee on the positive recommendations made in its Advisory Report of 5 December 2018 (Advisory Report) to improve the drafting of the Bill. These include the following recommendations:

- Recommendation 9 – for the Bill to be amended to clarify the meaning of ‘systemic weakness’ and to clarify that technical capability notices cannot be used to create a systemic weakness (Recommendation 9); and
- Recommendation 11 – for the Bill to be amended to allow a designated communications provider (DCP) to seek a binding assessment on whether a technical capability notice (TCN) fulfils certain pre-conditions for issuance (Recommendation 11).


We note that the Act includes most of the Committee’s recommendations. However, further improvements can be made to the Act, including to give better and fuller effect to the Committee’s recommendations.

In particular, the Act can be amended to improve, among other things:
- oversight of the issuance and variation of technical assistance notices (TANs) and TCNs; and
- the definition of ‘systemic weakness’.

Our specific comments and recommendations in this regard are in section B below.

We also offer additional comments and recommendations, in relation to other concerns we have with the Act, in section C below.

**B. SPECIFIC COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPLEMENT COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Improve oversight of issuance and variation of TANs and TCNs

   There continues to be insufficient independent oversight of the issuance of mandatory TANs and TCNs under the Act. We support further enhancements to the Act, including to fully implement the Committee’s Recommendations.

1.1 Address deficiencies in implementing Committee recommendations

   We note that the Act now contains a more defined process for an affected DCP to seek an assessment\(^3\) of whether a TCN fulfils certain pre-conditions before being issued or varied (including compliance with the prohibition\(^4\) against requiring a DCP to implement or build a systemic weakness or systemic vulnerability) (TCN Assessment Process). This is ostensibly in furtherance of the Committee’s Recommendation 11.

   While we appreciate this improvement in the Act (as compared with the Bill), the Act does not fully implement the Committee’s Recommendation 11. For example, under the current TCN Assessment Process in the Act:
   - the assessors are appointed by the Attorney-General (AG) only\(^5\) (which could create concerns over their independence), instead of being appointed jointly by the AG and the DCP as contemplated under Recommendation 11;
   - the assessors need only consider\(^6\) whether the relevant pre-conditions have been met for issuance of a TCN, instead of needing to agree that these conditions have been met as contemplated by Recommendation 11; and
   - the assessment does not appear to be binding on the AG\(^7\) as contemplated by Recommendation 11.

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\(^3\) See Schedule 1, item 7, sections 317WA and 317YA of the Act.

\(^4\) See Schedule 1, item 7, section 317ZG of the Act.

\(^5\) See Schedule 1, item 7, sections 317WA(2) and 317YA(2) of the Act.

\(^6\) See Schedule 1, item 7, section 317WA(7) of the Act.

\(^7\) Under Schedule 1, item 7, sections 317WA(11) and the 317YA(10) of the Act, the AG only needs to “have regard to” the relevant assessment report.
Additionally, the TCN Assessment Process in respect of the variation of TCNs\(^8\) omits certain matters from the list of matters to be assessed (as compared to the TCN Assessment Process in respect of the issuance TCNs), such as:

- whether the requirements imposed by the TCN as proposed to be varied are reasonable and proportionate;\(^9\)
- whether compliance with the TCN as proposed to be varied is practicable;\(^10\)
- whether compliance with the TCN as proposed to be varied is technically feasible;\(^11\) and
- whether the TCN as proposed to be varied is the least intrusive measure that would be effective in achieving the legitimate objective of the TCN as proposed to be varied.\(^12\)

This results in a potential loophole whereby DCPs could be made to do acts or things, under a varied TCN, that would otherwise have been prohibited under the initial TCN.

We note that the amendments in sheet no. 8625 tabled by the Opposition in Parliament\(^13\) (**8625 Amendments**) would give better effect to Recommendation 11, as they provide for the assessments to be binding on the AG and for the assessors to have to agree on the matters to be assessed. Additionally, the 8625 Amendments, which would require the same list of matters to be considered in respect of both the issuance and the variation of TCNs, would resolve the potential loophole mentioned above. However, further amendments will still need to be made to ensure that the assessors are jointly appointed by the AG and the DCP (and not by the AG only) to give full effect to Recommendation 11.

In respect of TCNs, we also note that the timeframes for DCPs to be consulted before the issuance or variation of TCNs (including for the TCN Assessment Process to run its course) can be truncated in the event of ‘urgency’.\(^14\) There is, however, no definition or guidelines as to what constitutes ‘urgency’.

In respect of TANs, we further note that, while DCPs must be consulted before the issuance of TANs, the consultation can also be dispensed with in cases of ‘urgency’.\(^15\) Additionally, there is no requirement to consult DCPs for variations of TANs, and the overall TAN regime does not include a similar assessment process as the TCN Assessment Process.

Due process would be enhanced by having greater transparency on what constitutes ‘urgency’ in respect of the issuance and variation of TANs and TCNs, requiring consultations with the DCP for both the issuance and variation of TANs, and including in the TAN regime a similar assessment process as the TCN Assessment Process.

**We recommend that:**

- with respect to the TCN Assessment Process, the 8625 Amendments should be adopted, with further amendments to require the joint appointment of the assessors by the AG and the DCP;
- the Act should include a definition and/or provisions providing greater clarity on what constitutes ‘urgency’;
- the TAN regime should require DCPs to be consulted before TANs are issued or varied; and

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\(^8\) See Schedule 1, item 7, section 317YA of the Act.

\(^9\) As compared with Schedule 1, item 7, section 317WA(7)(a)(ii) of the Act.

\(^10\) As compared with Schedule 1, item 7, section 317WA(7)(a)(iii) of the Act.

\(^11\) As compared with Schedule 1, item 7, section 317WA(7)(a)(iv) of the Act.

\(^12\) As compared with Schedule 1, item 7, section 317WA(7)(a)(v) of the Act.


\(^14\) See Schedule 1, item 7, sections 317W(3) and 317Y(3) of the Act.

\(^15\) See Schedule 1, item 7, section 317PA(2) of the Act.
• the TAN regime should include a similar assessment process as the TCN Assessment Process.

1.2 Provide for greater judicial oversight

In our submission of 12 October 2018 to the Committee (12 October Submission), we had recommended that the assistance and access regime should be underpinned by judicial authorization and incorporate a robust judicial oversight and challenge mechanism.

Subject to our comments in section B1.1 above, Recommendation 11, if fully implemented in the Act, would provide a firm opportunity for an affected DCP to request and make representations in an assessment of whether a TCN should be issued (or varied), and would require one of the assessors to be a person who has served as a judge for a period of 5 years (but who no longer holds commission as a judge). Recommendation 8 of the Committee’s Advisory Report (which the Act has implemented)\(^\text{16}\) would also require TCNs to be approved by the Minister of Communications prior to their issuance.

While these additional safeguards are positive improvements upon the Bill for due process and oversight, the determination of whether a TCN (or TAN) should be issued (or varied) should ultimately involve an independent, objective judicial authority. This is especially important considering the intrusive nature of TANs and TCNs and their potential to compromise the security and privacy of organizations and individuals. Relating to this, we support the amendments in sheet no. 8627 tabled by the Opposition in Parliament\(^\text{17}\) (8627 Amendments), which would provide for greater judicial involvement and oversight in the issuance and variation of TANs and TCNs.

To enhance due process and transparency under the Act, we reiterate that the assistance and access regime should include a procedure to allow an affected DCP to challenge a decision to issue or vary a TAN or TCN on its merits. This would also include the ability to request a review of the decision based on any new evidence that arises after the decision is made. At the minimum, the Act should not exclude the new Part 15 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (i.e., the provisions governing the issuance of technical assistance requests (TARs), TANs, and TCNs) from the scope of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, so as to afford affected DCPs full and proper recourse to judicial review in respect of decisions under the new Part 15 of the Telecommunications Act 1997.

We recommend that:
• the decision to issue or vary a TAN or TCN should be made or approved by an independent judicial authority and, in relation to this, the 8627 Amendments should be adopted at the minimum; and
• the Act should incorporate a procedure to allow an affected DCP to challenge a decision to issue or vary a TAN or TCN on its merits and, in relation to this, the Act should be amended to remove the exclusion of the new Part 15 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 from the scope of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act at the minimum.

1.3 Additional improvements to oversight mechanisms

Under the Act, there is no need for law enforcement agencies to show that they have gone through an escalation of process before turning to issuing a TAN or TCN. It would be useful to clarify the processes that agencies will have to go through to prove that they have exhausted all options before escalating their request to require a TAN or TCN to be issued to a DCP. This would prevent

\(^{16}\) See Schedule 1, item 7, section 317TAAA(1)(b) and the related section 317XA(1)(a)(ii) of the Act.

\(^{17}\) Available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6195.
agencies from using the Act as an ‘easy way out’ to get access to encrypted communications, especially in situations where less intrusive means of accessing such information are available.

Additionally, there is currently no single agency overseeing the issuance of TANs and TCNs (and TARs) under the Act. This may result in a DCP receiving multiple requests for similar information and assistance from different agencies, which would unnecessarily burden the DCP and result in inefficiency in the provision to and receipt by law enforcement agencies of information and assistance.

We recommend that:
- there should be a transparent escalation process adopted under the Act for law enforcement agencies to go through prior to issuing TANs or TCNs; and
- there should be a central agency under the Act to coordinate the issuance of TANs and TCNs (and TARs).

2. **Improve definition of ‘systemic weakness’**

Pursuant to Recommendation 9, we note that the Act now includes in section 317B the following definitions for ‘systemic weakness’ and the related ‘systemic vulnerability’:

“**systemic vulnerability** means a vulnerability that affects a whole class of technology, but does not include a vulnerability that is selectively introduced to one or more target technologies that are connected with a particular person. For this purpose, it is immaterial whether the person can be identified.”

“**systemic weakness** means a weakness that affects a whole class of technology, but does not include a weakness that is selectively introduced to one or more target technologies that are connected with a particular person. For this purpose, it is immaterial whether the person can be identified.”

However, the above Act definitions are broad and ambiguous. For example, it is unclear:
- what constitutes ‘a whole class of technology’; and
- when a target technology would not be ‘connected with a particular person’ (and hence fall within the definitions of ‘systemic weakness’ and ‘systemic vulnerability’ and be covered by the general prohibition against requiring DCPs to implement or build systemic weaknesses and systemic vulnerabilities), especially when considering that the definition of ‘target technologies’ in the Act is extremely broad and includes services, software, or equipment that are used or ‘likely to be used’, ‘whether directly or indirectly’, by the target individual.

The breadth and ambiguity of the current definitions will result in great difficulty in proving when a systemic weakness or systemic vulnerability is created. Put another way, these definitions significantly reduce the effectiveness of the general prohibition in section 317ZG against requiring DCPs to implement or build systemic weaknesses or systemic vulnerabilities.

In our 31 October 2018 submission to the Committee, we had proposed amending section 317ZG (of the Bill) to include definitions for ‘systemic weakness’ and ‘systemic vulnerability’, and to ensure that the acts and things that a DCP can be required to do under the assistance and access regime should not include implementing or building any weakness or vulnerability in any system, product, service, or component.

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18 Schedule 1, item 7, section 317B of the Act.
19 Schedule 1, item 7, section 317ZG of the Act.
We have updated our proposed amendments (to account for the existing language of section 317ZG in the Act) and offer these for the Committee’s re-consideration:

(Red double-underlined text = text to be added; red struck-through text = text to be deleted)

**“317ZG Designated communications provider must not be requested or required to implement or build a systemic weakness or systemic vulnerability etc.**

(1) A technical assistance request, technical assistance notice or technical capability notice must not have the effect of:
   (a) requiring a designated communications provider to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into a form of electronic protection;
   or
   (b) preventing a designated communications provider from rectifying a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, in a form of electronic protection.

(2) The reference in paragraph (1)(a) to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into a form of electronic protection includes a reference to implement or build a new decryption capability in relation to a form of electronic protection.

(3) The reference in paragraph (1)(a) to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into a form of electronic protection includes a reference to one or more actions that would render a systemic methods of authentication or encryption less effective.

(4) Subsections (2) and (3) are enacted for the avoidance of doubt.

(4A) In a case where a weakness is selectively introduced to one or more target technologies that are connected with a particular person, the reference in paragraph (1)(a) to implement or build a systemic weakness into a form of electronic protection includes a reference to any act or thing that will, or is likely to, jeopardise the security of any information held by any other person.

(4B) In a case where a vulnerability is selectively introduced to one or more target technologies that are connected with a particular person, the reference in paragraph (1)(a) to implement or build a systemic vulnerability into a form of electronic protection includes a reference to any act or thing that will, or is likely to, jeopardise the security of any information held by any other person.

(4C) For the purposes of subsections (4A) and (4B), an act or thing will, or is likely to, jeopardise the security of information if the act or thing creates a material risk that otherwise secure information can be accessed by an unauthorised third party.

(5) A technical assistance request, technical assistance notice or technical capability notice has no effect to the extent (if any) to which it would have an effect covered by paragraph (1)(a) or (b).

(6) In this [section][Part]:

- **system** includes product, service, and component.

- **systemic weakness** means a weakness in a system that extends, or carries the risk of being extended, beyond a targeted system in a manner that affects:
  (a) other systems;
  (b) the integrity of activities or processes, including patch management or configuration, that are integral to the functionality or security of other systems;
  (c) other users of the targeted system or other systems.

- **systemic vulnerability** means a systemic weakness that can be exploited to negatively impact a system or a user of the system.*
We would again welcome the opportunity to continue refining the language above in discussion and collaboration with the Committee and other relevant Government and Opposition stakeholders.

We also note that the amendments in sheets nos. 8626 and 8629 tabled by the Opposition in Parliament (8626/8629 Amendments) offer an alternative to the current drafting of section 317ZG. While the 8626/8629 Amendments do not include any definition for ‘systemic weakness’ or ‘systemic vulnerability’, the amendments nonetheless do address to a certain degree our concerns.21 We would accordingly be prepared to support the adoption of the 8626/8629 Amendments at the minimum.

We recommend that:

- our proposed amendments above to section 317ZG should be adopted (with further refinements as may be appropriate in consultation with the Committee and other relevant Government and Opposition stakeholders); and
- as an alternative to our proposed amendments, the 8626/8629 Amendments should be adopted.

C. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the specific comments and recommendations in section B above to implement the Committee’s Recommendations, we offer the following comments and suggested amendments to the Act for the Committee’s consideration.

1. Clarify that the Act does not introduce new interception authorities

New section 317ZGA22 provides that a TCN has no effect to the extent that it requires the DCP to ensure that a telecommunications service or telecommunications system has: (i) a capability to enable a communication passing over the system to be intercepted; (ii) a capability to transmit lawfully intercepted information to applicable delivery points; or (iii) a delivery capability. This appears to ensure that interception capabilities are to be dealt with under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act).23

To further clarify that the Act does not grant any new interception authority, whether under TCNs or TANs, we recommend that:
- section 317ZGA should be expanded to cover TANs (mutatis mutandis); and/or
- a new provision should be inserted (possibly in the current section 317ZH24) to the effect that “a technical assistance notice or technical capability notice has no effect to the extent (if any) to which it would require a designated communications provider to build or implement a capability to intercept communications, unless the designated communications provider is a carriage service provider or carrier for the purposes of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.”

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20 Available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6195.
21 The 8626/8629 Amendments import the key factor, from our proposed amendments, for determining when there is a systemic weakness (or systemic vulnerability) – i.e., the risk that the weakness affects other users/information. However, the 8626/8629 Amendments have added a ‘materiality’ requirement, which we would prefer to have excluded, as it raises the threshold for determining what is a systemic weakness or systemic vulnerability.
22 Schedule 1, item 7, section 317ZGA of the Act.
24 Schedule 1, item 7, section 317ZH of the Act.
2. **Limit the Act’s scope in terms of extraterritorial effect and organizations subject to the Act**

One of the recommendations in our 12 October Submission was to limit the application of the Bill, in terms of both extraterritorial effect and the types of organizations that were subject to the Bill. In this regard, we note that the Act continues to apply not only to organizations directly providing communications services in Australia, but also to organizations operating outside of Australia and anywhere in the supply chain, including organizations that might have no control over the final product or service and virtually no link to Australia.

Furthermore, TARs, TANs, and TCNs can be issued to a DCP for the purposes of enforcing the criminal laws of a foreign country. This means that the Act could potentially be leveraged by other countries to bypass their own law enforcement processes.

**We recommend that:**

- it should be an explicit requirement that a TAN or TCN should be issued to the organization that is the most appropriate to provide the required assistance;
- the extraterritorial application of the Act should be limited by:
  - expressly carving out organizations that are not actively targeting the Australian market for their business activities;
  - expressly carving out organizations that do not exercise control over the final product or service (to address supply chain implications);
  - extending the defense in section 317ZB(5) to:
    - non-compliance with a TAN or TCN in respect of activities within Australia where compliance will result in a breach of another jurisdiction’s laws;
    - non-compliance with a provision contemplated under Schedules 2 through 5 of the Bill, in respect of activities in foreign jurisdictions as well as within Australia; and
    - criminal penalties that the Provider may be exposed to in Australia due to non-compliance with any provision of the Bill where compliance will result in a breach of another jurisdiction’s laws;
  - confining the applicability of the Act to only crimes punishable under the Australian legal system; and
  - inserting a new provision (possibly in section 317ZH, or an expanded section 317ZGA in line with our recommendation in section C.1 above) to the effect that "a technical assistance notice or technical capability notice has no effect to the extent (if any) to which it would require a designated communications provider to do an act or thing in violation of a foreign country’s law."

3. **Limit TARs, TANs, and TCNs to serious offences with a higher penalty threshold and to narrowly-defined national security circumstances**

In our 12 October Submission, we had recommended limiting the list of purposes for which TARs, TANs, and TCNs could be issued to preventing or detecting serious crime and protecting against an identified threat to national security under a narrowly defined set of circumstances. We commend, in this regard, the Act’s inclusion of a ‘serious Australian offence’ qualifier in respect of the purposes for which TARs, TANs, and TCNs may be issued.

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25 See Schedule 1, item 7, sections 317G(2), 317L(2), and 317T(2) of the Act.

26 Schedule 1, item 7, section 317ZB(5) of the Act, which provides a DCP a defence against civil penalties for non-compliance with a TAN or TCN, where compliance with the TAN or TCN in a foreign jurisdiction will result in the Provider breaching the laws of that jurisdiction.

27 See Schedule 1, item 7, sections 317G(2), 317L(2), and 317T(2) of the Act.
However, we note that ‘serious Australian offence’ is defined in Section 317B as “an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 3 years or more or for life.” While this is consistent with the Committee’s Recommendation 2 in its Advisory Report, the 3-year imprisonment threshold covers many other types of offences that are not as serious as terrorism or child abuse, which the Act was intended to capture. Additionally, this threshold is not aligned with the TIA Act, which defines ‘serious offence’ as, among others, “an offence punishable by imprisonment for life or for a period, or maximum period, of at least 7 years” (emphasis added). The definitions should be aligned for clarity and to avoid confusion in the Australian law enforcement regime. We further note that there remains no definition or criteria in the Act for what is considered ‘national security’.

We recommend that:
- the definition of ‘serious Australian offence’ under the Act should be aligned with the definition of ‘serious offence’ under the TIA Act; and
- with respect to national security, the use of TARs, TANs, and TCNs should be limited to protecting against an identified threat to national security under a narrowly defined set of circumstances (such as preventing an imminent national security threat to Australia and its citizens).

4. **Ensure the protection of technical information including source code**

Another concern raised in our 12 October Submission was on the disclosure of technical information such as source code, which constitutes one of the most valuable assets of BSA’s members.

We recommend that:
- the Act should include additional protections in respect of the use and protection of technical information, such as a purpose limitation, obligations to have in place appropriate security measures, and limitations on retention periods;
- technical information that DCPs may be compelled to disclose should be limited to information that is public or commonly shared under commercial non-disclosure agreements; and
- DCPs should not be required to reveal their sensitive intellectual property, including source code and, in relation to this, a new provision should be inserted (possibly in section 317ZH or an expanded section 317ZGA in line with our recommendation in section C.1 above) to the effect that “a technical assistance notice or technical capability notice has no effect to the extent (if any) to which it would require a designated communications provider to disclose or provide any source code that it has not already made available publicly or previously disclosed or provided to a government entity.”

5. **Improve handling of vulnerability information**

In our 12 October 2018 Submission, we also commented on the risks associated with vulnerabilities that have not yet been patched and that could be exploited by bad actors, including nation state bad actors, who learn of those vulnerabilities. Given the broad new information gathering powers granted to law enforcement under the Act (including remote access searches and seizure of evidence on computers) it is very likely that law enforcement and intelligence officials will handle vulnerability information, including information on vulnerabilities of which the DCPs themselves are unaware.

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28 The Committee’s Recommendation 2 is for the industry assistance measures under the Bill, so far as they relate to criminal law enforcement, to apply to offences with a penalty of a maximum period of 3 years’ imprisonment or more.

We recommend that:
- DCPs should not be compelled to reveal details of vulnerabilities that have not yet been patched; and
- a transparent policy for handling and disclosing vulnerabilities the Government discovers and that are unknown to DCPs should be included in the Act.

6. **De-criminalize unauthorized disclosures of information by employees of DCPs**

The provisions in section 317ZF\(^3\) against unauthorized disclosures of information appear not to require any *mens rea* and could result in employees of DCPs, who are seeking to comply with a TAR, TAN, or TCN, but who make innocent and/or inadvertent disclosures, being exposed to imprisonment for up to 5 years. For example, if an engineer, who is an employee of a DCP, were to be required to build a tool pursuant to a TCN and: (i) the engineer asks another colleague a technical question relating to the TCN; or (ii) if the TCN were so burdensome and consequential to the DCP’s business that the engineer and/or the DCP’s lawyers must consult the business head or the CEO of the DCP, they could face imprisonment of up to five years (as these scenarios might not be covered under the exceptions in section 317ZF).

To ensure that DCPs are not unduly hindered in their ability to address TARs, TANs, or TCNs, **we recommend that** unauthorized employee disclosures of information should be de-criminalized by, for example, deleting section 317ZF(1)(b)(ii).

7. **Provide a longer time period for DCPs to comply with TANs and TCNs**

DCPs are, by default, given 90 days to comply with TANs and 180 days to comply with TCNs.\(^3\) These are short periods of time considering the need for the DCP to develop an approach to comply with the relevant requirement(s). The Act should not set an arbitrary number that does not reflect the realities on the ground such as the need to shift resources and meet internal processes to comply with the request.

**We recommend that** the window of compliance should be determined in consultation with the DCP, based on the degree of compliance needed (e.g., amount of information sought, types of information sought, etc.).

D. **CONCLUSION**

As we noted in our earlier submissions to the Committee, the issues concerning the assistance and access regime are complex and sensitive. Accordingly, in addition to the comments and proposals above, BSA would again like to commend, for the Committee’s consideration, the other recommendations in our 12 October 2018 Submission which have not been specifically reiterated above, but which remain unaddressed in the Act.

BSA and our members remain at the disposal of the Committee and the Australian Government and Opposition stakeholders to help develop and deliver other enduring solutions to address the challenges of accessing evidence in the digital age.

**BSA | THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE**

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\(^{3}\) Schedule 1, item 7, section 317ZF of the Act.

\(^{3}\) See Schedule 1, item 7, sections 317MA(1)(b) and 317TA(1)(b) of the Act.
APPENDIX D

BSA Submission to PJCIS

of

26 June 2019
June 26, 2019

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
By online submission

REVIEW OF THE AMENDMENTS MADE BY THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (ASSISTANCE AND ACCESS) ACT 2018 – BSA COMMENTS

BSA | The Software Alliance (BSA) refers to the review by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (Committee) of the amendments made to Commonwealth legislation by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Assistance and Access Act).

BSA re-affirms our interest in the issues being discussed in relation to the Assistance and Access Act, and thanks the Committee for this further comment opportunity.

In this submission, we address the interaction of the Assistance and Access Act with the United States’ Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act).

Our previous submissions to the Committee on the Assistance and Access Act (including when it was only a bill) also remain relevant to the Committee’s present review. We commend these previous submissions to the Committee for the Committee’s re-consideration.

1 BSA (www.bsa.org) is the leading advocate for the global software industry before governments and in the international marketplace. BSA’s members are at the forefront of data-driven innovation, including cutting-edge advancements in data analytics, machine learning, and the Internet of Things. They earn users’ confidence by providing essential security technologies, such as encryption, to protect customers from cyber threats.


Overview of the CLOUD Act

The CLOUD Act was enacted to, among other things, update the legal framework for US law enforcement to access data stored by specified communications service providers (CSPs) who are subject to US jurisdiction, regardless of where the data is stored and pursuant to specific legal processes.

Of particular relevance to this submission, the CLOUD Act also empowers the US Government to enter into executive agreements with other eligible governments to enable law enforcement agencies to access data across each other’s borders to investigate and prosecute serious crimes, subject to an agreed-upon set of processes and controls negotiated between the two governments. As described in a US Department of Justice white paper (DOJ White Paper), under such agreements, “each country would remove any legal barriers that may otherwise prohibit compliance with qualifying court orders issued by the other country. Both nations would be able to submit orders for electronic evidence needed to combat serious crime directly to CSPs, without involving the other government and without fear of conflict with U.S. or the other nation’s law.” Such agreements would thus provide a potentially more expedited means, as compared to the current Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) regime, for law enforcement agencies to obtain electronic evidence stored abroad in criminal investigations.

As pre-conditions to the US Government entering into an executive agreement with a foreign government, the CLOUD Act (in §105) requires, among other things, that:

1. “the domestic law of the foreign government, including the implementation of that law, affords robust substantive and procedural protections for privacy and liberties…”, which would include “protection from arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy” and “sufficient mechanisms to provide accountability and appropriate transparency regarding the collection and use of electronic data by the foreign government”; and

2. with respect to any law enforcement order subject to the executive agreement and to be issued by the foreign government, the order must “be subject to review or oversight by a court, judge, magistrate, or other independent authority prior to, or in proceedings regarding, enforcement of the order”.

Potential Conflict between the Assistance and Access Act and the CLOUD Act

In its current form, the Assistance and Access Act could undermine Australia’s qualification to enter into an executive agreement because of concerns the Assistance and Access Act creates about Australia’s compliance with the above standards in the CLOUD Act.

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5 The CLOUD Act applies to two types of service providers:

(1) providers of “electronic communications services”, which are defined as “services that provide users with “the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” (18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)); and

(2) providers of “remote computing services”, which are defined as “services that provide “to the public” “computer storage or processing services” using an electronic communications system. (18 U.S.C. § 2711(2))

6 The CLOUD Act does not define “serious crime” other than that it includes “terrorism”.


In particular, the Assistance and Access Act authorizes the Australian government to issue technical assistance notices (TANs) and technical capability notices (TCNs) to compel private companies to build or implement certain surveillance capabilities, without any recourse to a merits review by an independent judicial authority before or after a TAN or TCN is issued, and limited recourse to judicial review of the administrative decision to issue the TAN or TCN after the fact. Further, while TCNs can only be issued by the Attorney-General with prior approval from the Minister of Communications (and Cybersafety), no such safeguard exists in respect of TANs, which can be issued by the heads of the relevant enforcement agencies with no pre-issuance review by any independent authority.

The Assistance and Access Act also provides broad authority to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to issue TANs or TCNs for the purpose of “safeguarding national security”, with little specific guidance as to the circumstances in which such purpose would apply, safeguards against abuse, and implementation oversight.

The above shortfalls in the overall TAN/TCN regime (among others) could result in the potentially arbitrary and non-transparent issuance of TANs and TCNs, in turn resulting in an arbitrary impact on privacy and liberties. This, coupled with the general lack of review or oversight by independent authorities in the TAN/TCN issuance process, would pose serious concerns as to whether the pre-conditions for entering into an executive agreement under the CLOUD Act are met.

To address these concerns and improve the prospects that Australia could be appropriately deemed to have met the standards in the CLOUD Act for entry into an executive agreement, the Assistance and Access Act should be amended to:

- make available a merits review by an independent judicial authority of any decision to issue a TAN or TCN, both before and after the issuance of the TAN or TCN;
- create a clear pathway for independent judicial review of any administrative decision to issue a TAN or TCN, such as by re-including Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (i.e., the provisions introduced by the Assistance and Access Act) in the scope of the *Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977*; and
- define how the authorities in the Assistance and Access Act may be used for the purpose of “safeguarding national security”, including by detailing the circumstances in which such purpose would apply, safeguards against abuse, and implementation oversight mechanisms.

**Conclusion**

As we noted in our earlier submissions to the Committee, the issues concerning the assistance and access regime are complex and sensitive. BSA and our members remain at the disposal of the Committee and the Australian Government and Opposition stakeholders to help develop and deliver other enduring solutions to address the challenges of accessing evidence in the digital age.

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